Key Security
No matter how sophisticated the design of a safe or strongroom door, the security features all reduce to one element, the key*. Safes are not perfect but failure to ensure that the key* is never handled or even scrutinised by other than the lawful holder can nullify the safemakers best efforts.
It should go without saying that the safe key should never be out of the personal possession of it's rightful custodian. Nor should it ever be left in the keyway unattended. At one time it was normal to fit locks which were key retaining - in other words the key could not be removed unless the safe was locked, and the same facility can still be provided today on special request. This is not perfect of course as the safe could be locked with the door open.
In an earlier page, 'Improvements', mention was made of the fact that even the best modern safes can be subjected to covert or surreptitious attack by means of false keys or lock manipulation, and the associated fact that in such circumstances, suspicion immediately falls on the legitimate keyholder.
Not surprisingly the industry had already taken this into consideration by providing a solution to overcome the possibility. That answer was the Time Lock which, once the safe was locked, was totally inaccessable, and which restricted the permitted opening times of the safe or strongroom within normal business hours, even after all the locks had been released.
Modern safes are seldom fitted with fire-chambers, rather just a hinged sheet metal pan giving access to the mechanism for service. This pan on a security safe should normally be fitted with two keylocks in order to limit access to the mechanism to service engineers. Failure to use this facility could permit illegal access to a lock which could then be seriously compromised - key or combination -without the weakness being realised, and subsequently allowing the safe to be opened - and locked again- without indulging in noticeably suspicious behaviour.
An example of a robbery where the safe keys were left unguarded is described here.
*For key include combination settings.
The Shettleston Bank Robbery - April 1959
On the morning of 29th April 1959 the staff of the Clydesdale Bank Shettleston Road Branch arrived to find that that the cash safe was lying open and empty.
The safe was a Milner List 5 of 1910 manufacture, and fitted with 3 keylocks.
It was clear that the safe had suffered no damage and that it had probably been opened with the true keys. There were no signs of forced entry into the premises. What puzzled the police was that a filing tray containing £3,739 was lying on the manager's desk.
The Bank cleaner was immediately sent for who explained that she had found the cash lying on the Bank floor close to the manager's room. The police pressed the Bank security officials for details of duplicate keys held at Head Office and were reassured that there had been no breach of security there. The Bank was then assured by a safe expert that false keys could not be cut from impressions of the true keys because of the fine limits applied to such as the Milner locks.
We now jump forward to the 30th of June when three people are arrested for the theft of more than £38,000 from the Clydesdale Bank Shettleston Road. They were Samuel McKay (34), Alexander Gray (35), and Jean Rice (34). They came to trial on the 19th September at the High Court in Glasgow but without Samuel McKay who had escaped from Barlinnie Prison Hospital Block on July 27th, and now with the addition of Hugh Mannion and John McKay, brother of the escapee Samuel.
The Bank manager was questioned about the possibility of the Bank apprentice having access to the keys in addition to the accountant, teller, and ledger clerk. It was normal practice for the manager to hold the key for the top lock and the second key to be in the possession of the teller. It appears that the third lock was not in use. The Bank apprentice, William Rae (18), decided at this stage to give himself up at the Eastern Police Station, and whose subsequent evidence confirmed that through him, the true keys had been impressioned for false keys to be made.
In his evidence Rae stated that that he had asked the accused Gray for part-time work in his betting shop which was situated "not far from the Bank". Gray had replied by saying that he wanted to rob a Bank. Rae went on to say that Gray had taken him to 'Cairns' public house in Miller Street and 'Sloans' in the Arcade and that "I don't remember much". He was, he said, eventally talked into it and Gray gave him a chromium plated soap dish filled with plastacine and asked him to impression keys.
There then followed a series of attempts to obtain good impressions from the keys which were often hanging from the safe's keyholes or otherwise lying around. When the teller went on holiday Rae was given his keys which he took to the betting shop where more impressions were taken. Rae was then given 3 keys to try but they were too short. A few days later he was given 9 keys to try but only one partially turned in the lock.
Gray then obtained the services of William Mercer, a foreman joiner with some lock experience, and who after trying to adjust the false keys told Gray that he would need to have the true keys in his possession to do it properly. Somehow this was achieved, keys made, and taken into the Bank by Gray (later found in possession of mortice lock key for bank door) who reported that he had opened the safe but "there was not much in it"
Rae let it be known when the local Teacher's salaries were to be held at the end of the month. He had been given £100 and was to receive half the proceeds from the robbery but instead decided to give himself up.
There is a very interesting footnote however. Knowing that suspicion would immediately fall on the Bank staff and which no doubt stood in the way of Rae's cooperation, it was decided to arrange for the safe to be blown after the money had been safely removed thereby diverting suspicion. To this end it was planned that the safe be robbed around 6 p.m. and that the safe blower would then arrive between 7 and 8 p.m. to blow it open. His fee for his work was to be left on the floor of the Bank. £3,739 to be exact! Most unusually however, the cleaner elected to carry out her work in the evening instead of her usual morning routine. The peterman, just about to let himself into the Bank, spotted that all the lights were on and beat a hasty retreat. The gang meantime were all setting themselves up with their alibis for mid evening, some creating a disturbance in the city centre, and others at Glasgow Airport.
As it happens, the plot would have unravelled in any case. The Milner List 5 as stated earlier has three locks running vertically down the door. It is also fitted with 3-way boltwork, operated by the handle and spindle through a cast steel triple bolt thrower which invariably breaks off when the centre lock which is situated right next to it is blown, leaving the bottom bolts irretrievably in the locked position.
The three main accused were each sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Rae's sentence is not known.
Following this incident the Clydesdale Bank cash safes were all fitted with two 4-wheel keyless combination locks with spy-proof dials and dial check locks.
The security was taken to an even higher level after the Premises Manager of the Bank attended a seminar in London by the President of Sargent & Greenleaf, Harry Miller. The main point of his presentation was to introduce to the security world his company's new manipulation-proof combination lock, but the reaction of the Bank's security chief was - well if you're now telling me that your standard combination locks can be manipulated I'll take this into account and go one step further - which he did. He had every cash safe retro-fitted with a time lock, but not one by S&G!
In having taken just one example it should not be assumed that a key has to be actually handled to be compromised. There have been instances where keys have been photographed through ultra long focus lenses as they were being entered into the keyhole, and where a pattern has been sufficiently clear to allow a copy to be made. In one case it was a Chubb 3G110 mortice key on a door of first entry which also acted as a shunt control for the intruder alarm system. Keyless combination locks being dialled up are just as vulnerable using similar methods, and in one case the action was recorded from a peep-hole in the false ceiling in front of the strong room door vestibule.
There has even been a case where it is believed that a 7-lever Kromer Novum key lying on a desk was visually memorised with sufficient accuracy to allow a highly skilled locksmith to apply the description of the sequence of the height of the steps (7 lifts each) to the making of a replica, which, although not perfect, was accurate enough to allow the key to be adjusted on site, using the top hinge carriage as an anvil, with the resultant filings leaving a tell-tale sign around the bottom hinge and without which the method of entry might never have been disclosed.
It is thought to have been an employee of a floral display service, who, having regular daytime access to the Building Society premises, had made the mental picture of the key.
Dual control locking should be standard on any high security safe. The ideal arrangement is by having both combination lock and keylock - the easy changeability of the first for overnight security and the convenience of the keylock for day use. Change-Key locks of course have the same facility as the combination locks although with fewer permutations. Having been available since the mid 1800's with the like of Hobbs & Co's Transmutation Changeable Keylock and the various but similar designs of all the leading British makers, their popularity is returning through the influence of the European and Scandinavian conglomorate which has sadly swallowed up most of the British safemaking industry.
9/12/05
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